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Ramachandra Byrappa  
 
Social Capital, Fukuyama in the Henhouse, and other Dangers to the 
Family and Community 
 
After two decades of economic globalization, new attempts are made to 
reassess social structures and their evolution during this period. Although the 
central theme of the debate is social capital the aims and the final use of its 
conceptual frame work differ, without anyone of the detractors having a 
universally acceptable definition. One of the reason why there is not an attempt 
made to reach consensus on the definition of social capital as a viable concept is 
because there seems to be a tug-of-war between social theorists on the one side 
and neo-liberal political thinkers in the likes of Francis Fukuyama on the other 
side. I will for my part try to put a ÄPRGHVW´ historical perspective on the matter. 
 
Preview: the real intensions of Francis Fukuyama and the neo-liberal 
school of thought. 
 
French philosophers and sociologists have tackled with the idea of defining 
the concept of social capital since the time of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. All the 
efforts since then have gone into the creation and a continuous renewal of the 
French Republic. In this sense the notion of social capital is closely embedded 
in republicanism and the democratic and other social institutions which 
together form it, the basic principle of ÄKXPDQULJKWV´ as the guiding force. In 
sociological terms these relations were borrowed from pre-existing institutions 
like the ÄIDPLO\´ and other forms of traditional ÄFRPPXQLWLHV´. This is not 
IRUJHWWLQJWKHIDFWWKDWUHSXEOLFVLQZKDWHYHUpSRTXHWKH\FDPHLQWRH[LVWHQFH
represented a degree of modernity in the face of their traditional counterparts 
because they were able to transcend some of the closed and restrictive aspects 
of the former.  
Although the republic represented an improvement on institutions like the 
family, we should be careful not create an opposition between these two 
structures. The intermediate institutions (family, village, geographical 
community etc) standing between the individual and the republic all share the 
same basic characteristics, namely that of ÄVROLGDULW\´, rudimentary forms of 
ÄVRFLDO MXVWLFH´ and, building and sharing a ÄFRPPRQGHVWLQ\´, specific to a 
particular community. In this perspective social capital as notion cannot be 
studied, understood and used for policy formation, in isolation with the concept 
of solidarity. At this point Francis Fukuyama breaks ranks; he reduces social 
capital to one of the ÄIDFWRUV´ that produces economic ÄHIILFLHQF\´, output and 
outstanding GDP. On the surface of it there is nothing wrong with this but 
pushed deeper this logic reveals itself to be a fundamental danger to social 
capital and social justice in all its forms. 
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This attempt is nothing more than neo-liberalism reinventing itself and 
penetrating itself into one of the last bastions of defense against the 
rollercoaster effects of globalization and failures of neo-liberal policies all over 
the world: ÄThe issue, for most societies, is whether they are net losers or 
gainers from this process, that is, whether globalization breaks down 
traditional cultural communities without leaving anything positive in its wake, 
or rather, is an external shock that breaks apart dysfunctional traditionals and 
social groups and becomes the entering wedge for modernity´.1 Fukuyama 
would like to redefine social capital in such a way that it will no longer 
represent a hindrance to global capitalism in the form of trade unions, 
conservationists, and protest groups against corruption or altra-mondialists 
trying to define alternative economic models. This shows the importance of the 
notion of Ä6RFLDO &DSLWDO´ in contemporary debate on the need for Äsocial 
VWUXFWXUHV´ to adapt to ÄHFRQRPLF FKDQJHV´, which are projected as 
ÄLQGLVSXWDEOH´ path upon which everyone should trod.  
Like in his analysis of Liberal democracy and its dialectical evolution in 
history, Francis Fukuyama uses the logic of a natural scientist, far from the 
logic used by some of us who always think that things cannot be so simple. 
Fukuyama begins by brushing off ÄPLVFRQFHSWLRQV´ about social capital and its 
definition: ÄThe norms that constitute social capital can range from a norm of 
reciprocity between two friends all the way up to complex and elaborately 
articulated doctrines like Christianity or Confucianism. They must be 
instantiated in an actual human relationship: the norm of reciprocity exists in 
potentia in my dealings with all people, but is actualised only in my dealings 
with my friends. By this definition, trust, networks, civil society, and the like, 
which have been associated with social capital, are all epiphenominal, arising 
DVD UHVXOWRI VRFLDO FDSLWDOEXWQRW FRQVWLWXWLQJ VRFLDO FDSLWDO LWVHOI´.2 Those 
who think that social capital is a new reincarnation of things like tradition, 
morality, code of conduct and other ethical behavior are called to reason by 
Fukuyama. Max Weber could well turn in his subterranean endowment.  
We know what is not, so let us turn to Francis Fukuyama for a ÄVFLHQWLILF´ 
definition of social capital: ÄPerhaps the reason that social capital seems less 
obviously a social good than physical or human capital is because it tends to 
produce more in the way of negative externalities than either of the other two 
forms. This is because group solidarity in human communities is often 
purchased at the price of hostility towards out-group members. There appears 
to be a natural human proclivity for dividing the world into friends and 
enemies that is the basis of all politics. It is thus very important when 
measuring social capital to consider its true utility net of its externalities. 
                                                 
1 Francis FUKUYAMA: Social Capital and Civil Society´ 7KH ,QVWLWXWH RI 3XEOLF 3ROLF\
George Mason University October 1, 1999; Prepared for delivery at the IMF Conference on 
Second Generation Reforms, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm 
2 FUKUYAMA: Ibid., see section I: What is social capital? 
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Another way of approaching this question is through the concept of the "radius 
of trust". All groups embodying social capital have a certain radius of trust, 
that is, the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. If a 
group's social capital produces positive externalities, the radius of trust can be 
larger than the group itself. It is also possible for the radius of trust to be 
smaller than the membership of the group, as in large organizations that foster 
cooperative norms only among the group's leadership or permanent staff. A 
modern society may be thought of as a series of concentric and overlapping 
radii of trust. These can range from friends and cliques up through NGOs and 
UHOLJLRXVJURXSV´ This so called radius of trust was at the center of the village 
life and constituted the core rudimentary institution of a traditional community. 
So what is that which distinguishes it from industrial or post-industrial 
emanation of trust?  
Although Fukuyama does not contest the existence of trust in traditional 
community he nonetheless sees a fundamental flaw in it: Ä«WUDGLWLRQDOVRFLDO
groups are also afflicted with an absence of what Mark Granovetter calls 
"weak ties," that is, heterodox individuals at the periphery of the society's 
various social networks who are able to move between groups and thereby 
become bearers of new ideas and information. Traditional societies are often 
segmentary, that is, they are composed of a large number of identical, self-
contained social units like villages or tribes. Modern societies, by contrast, 
consist of a large number of overlapping social groups that permit multiple 
memberships and identities. Traditional societies have fewer opportunities for 
weak ties among the segments that make it up, and therefore pass on 
LQIRUPDWLRQ LQQRYDWLRQ DQG KXPDQ UHVRXUFHV OHVV HDVLO\´.3 From this it is 
clear that Fukuyama treats the structures of traditional society as a kind of 
mafia grouping where the bonds of trust are very strong inside the formation 
but are often ÄFRQIOLFWXDO´ and ÄFRHUFLYH´ with the outside world. In fact he 
sees Chinese society, which uses Confucian ethics as the rule of the game, as 
structurally flawed because it produces corruption instead of the well awaited 
benefits from social capital. Fukuyama is conclusive of his propositions: ÄIn 
many Latin American societies, a narrow radius of trust produces a two-tier 
moral system, with good behavior reserved for family and personal friends, 
and a decidedly lower standard of behavior in the public sphere. This serves as 
a cultural foundation for corruption, which is often regarded as a legitimate 
ZD\RIORRNLQJDIWHURQH
VIDPLO\´.4 
Fukuyama and his American contemporaries are evidently biased in their 
treatment of social capital by focusing only on the immaterial part of social 
capital. There are reasons for this: material aspect, or social infrastructure as 
some would say, does not fit either into the neo-liberal school of thinking or the 
                                                 
3 FUKUYAMA: op.cit. 
4 FUKUYAMA: op.cit. 
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Äprivatization of the welfare-VWDWH´ policies preached by the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund. It looks like the purpose of this reorientation is to 
place the ongoing debate on the role of the State on such a direction that past or 
present attempts on reducing the role the state will not be contested. Since 
those who oppose globalization are also those who want the State to actively 
ÄUHJHQHUDWH´ the ÄSXEOLF VSKHUH´ ± one of the key aspects of social capital. 
The talk in these circles is not a reduction of the state but an increase in its pro-
activeness. So one of the aims of this current study should be to reintroduce the 
physical aspects of social capital into the debate. 
Another trend, and the undercurrents of the actual debate, is to recast 
traditional institutions of social capital in a negative light. Fukuyama and his neo-
liberal clones speak about families, villages and tribes as if these have an isolated 
existence, totally closed from the outside world, living in perpetual darkness. 
This is not the case. Pierre Bourdieu and Immanuel Wallerstein5 have long 
conceptualized and explained the historic reality: the world, starting from around 
the 12th Century A. D. was a matrix of interconnected socio-economic systems. It 
is very easy for Francis Fukuyama, for the sake of theoretical convenience, to 
refer to historical or sociological evidence which does not enjoy any tangible 
empirical evidence. But this does not distance him from his intended purpose: 
traditions and cultural purposes all have, directly or indirectly, economic 
consequences. Thus whatever modifications we can implant in the traditional 
patterns of behavior, will ultimately modify the economic structure of society: 
transform ÄVRFLDOLVWLF´ behavior into ÄFRPPHUFLDO´ one. Some would argue that 
an outright replacement is attempted. 
Another false assumption is that free market is something that came into 
existence in 20th Century North-Western hemisphere. There is an assertion that 
the rest of world is living in the dark age of Änon-marNHW´ allocation of 
resources. I challenge Fukuyama to empirically prove his case. Free and fair 
competition has existed in the Asian continent for centuries and constitutes a 
corner stone of village economic life. As Wallerstein explains, these movements 
of exchange of goods and ideas spanned from the rims of the Black Sea area to 
the remote corners of Indonesia, goods transiting from market to market. But the 
forces controlling these markets worked within the boundaries of regulated 
patterns of social capital. Only the positive aspects of the market were allowed 
prevail. Any damaging side effects of the market, such as externalities, were 
thought to be unsustainable. If tradition in market place means less negative 
effects like ÄZDVWH´ and ÄSROOXWLRQ´ then it has achieved its defined optimum. 
What ÄPRGHUQ´ markets do is to produce ÄH[WHUQDOLWLHV´ without assuming their 
costs. This may produce market optimum in capital allocation but taken as whole 
it stands on sub-optimum level, since this outcome cannot be sustained. 
                                                 
5 Immanuel WALLERSTEIN, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, New York 
1974.  
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Continuous destruction non-renewable natural resources and abrupt modification 
of social patterns leads to a lowering of both in terms of ÄVWRFNV´, which are not 
accounted for in economic indicators like GDP growth.  
)XNX\DPD¶V DWWDFN RQ WUDGLWLonal sources or generators of social capital is 
shrouded in mathematical formulas and a lot of tears shed on the state of civil 
society and liberal democracy, the decrease both which leads to an all powerful 
and over-burdening State. While the real purpose of his theoretical 
gesticulation is economic. It is a systematic attempt to rip apart the Republic 
and its intermediary constituents like the family and community.  
 
Reappraisal: The state of the family and the community as generators 
of social capital. 
 
The Individual and the State are entities which enjoy political and legal 
status but the Family as an intermediary entity does not enjoy any political 
action or weight; it is treated as pseudo-legal entity defined according to the 
necessity of the day. This is mainly confined to its ÄUHSURGXFWLYH´ capacities 
and the State supports this function through nominal financial acquittals, and 
meager legal recognition. But the physical burden of the State and the 
Individual are all borne by this entity: it functions as an instrument of economic 
support, common denominator of public order and the primary social integrator 
of individuals. In times of political upheavals and economic crisis individuals 
fall back on the family structure for both physical and moral comfort, without 
any subsequent cost to the State. In times of prolonged military conflicts, order 
does exist although there is no State-structure to enforce it, thanks to role of the 
family. In this way whatever weakens the Family destabilizes the entire 
society. The Institute for Families in Society (University of South Carolina) 
sees the role of family as follows: ÄFamilies are dynamic and interdependent 
XQLWVRIVRFLHW\ZKLFKWDNHIRUPVDQGIXQFWLRQVDFFRUGLQJWRVRFLHW\¶VFKDQJLQJ
needs and the expressive aQGLQVWUXPHQWDOQHHGVRIWKHIDPLOLHV¶PHPEHUV(«) 
Whatever their structure, we believe that the primary function of families is to 
provide for the perpetuation and enhancement of culture and society by the 
nurturance, care, protection, and socialization of their members throughout 
life. Conversely, whatever the structure of the families within it, a primary 
responsibility of society is to provide the necessary supports to sustain them in 
IXOILOOLQJWKRVHIXQFWLRQV´.6 
This vision is not always shared by the State. The relations between the 
State and the Family are both co-operative and conflictual. As a relatively 
newcomer the State sees itself as an opponent of the family in the struggle for 
ÄOHJLWLPDF\´ and the ÄFRQWURO´ of the individual. David J. Herring has written 
                                                 
6 Institute for Families in Society: general statement on families, this institute is part of the 
University of South Carolina. http://ifs.sc.edu/textversion/sof.asp (date of retrieval 2007-01-15) 
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that the role of the family in democratic society has been incomplete. He 
advocates a richer discourse around six family functions: three functions 
supporting the power of the state and three functions which may serve to 
undermine the power of the state, while supporting the development and 
functioning of a pluralistic democratic society. Herring describes three positive 
functions of the family: producing democratic citizens, relieving the state of the 
burden of caring for dependent citizens, and diminishing the power of other 
intermediate associations that could challenge the state. He makes a strong case 
for the three subversive functions that check state power and promote a 
ÄUKHWRULFRIDVVRFLDWLRQDOUHVSHFW´ LQFOXGLQJWKHIDPLO\¶VUROH LQ the creation 
and maintenance of a broad array of intermediate associations, the production 
of adults capable of forming strong intermediate associations, and the 
development of citizens with associational tolerance.7 
Herring demonstrates the adaptive ability of the family by drawing on 
American slave narratives, studies of the Israeli kibbutz, and a review of the 
frontier families in the American west. Despite the family disruption these 
experiences caused, family ties remained resilient, demonstrating the strong 
human preference for family associations. Beginning with an historical 
investigation of African-American family structures, the researchers uncovered 
a wealth of descriptive ethnographic studies of extended black family life. The 
black elderly encompassed many roles that other races have in extended 
families, but were particularly bonded through the Äsocial, political and 
economic adversities experienced by black families throughout American 
history´. Such roles included being Äfamily stabilizers´ who provided both 
physical and spiritual support for families. Medicinal folk-doctors, familial 
storytellers, family counselors and mediators could all be positions provided 
for by the black elders of a family. Likewise, child rearing was often shared 
with grandmothers, aunts and cousins.8 For reasons of legitimacy and political 
pressure from social groups and trade unions the State decided to takeover the 
role of this extended family. 
 
From social capital of ÄERQGV RI EORRG´ towards ÄLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG´ 
social capital 
 
To gain legitimacy and cut a compromise with the family structure of 
society, the modern State embarked upon two maneuvers: Firstly it decided to 
relieve the family of some of its burdens mentioned above. Reviewing the work 
                                                 
7 David J. HERRING: The Public Family: Exploring its Role in Democratic Society, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 2003. See also informative review by Rosalie R. 
YOUNG (University of Maryland), www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/ 
herring0206.htm (date of retrieval 2007-01-15). 
8 Linda M. BURTON and Peggye DILWORTH-ANDERSON: The Intergenerational Family 
Roles of Aged Black Americans, Marriage and Family Review 3;4 16:1991. 311-330. 
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of Susan Pedersen on the welfare state, Christiane Eifert writes the following: 
ÄPrevious investigations into the origins of the welfare state have treated 
family policy rather sparingly. They have focused instead on the confrontation 
between the state and the working class as the central issue leading to 
construction of social policies, and, as a consequence, they have emphasized 
topics related to the condition of the labour market for male workers ± social 
insurance, for example. Given this perspective, welfare programs directed at 
the family have been left unexamined; indeed, the whole issue of relations 
between the state and the family could not be analyzed. Pedersen therefore 
takes the economic, social, and political dependence of family members as the 
starting point for her reflections, arguing that this very dependence, together 
with normative models of the family, had a fundamental influence on all 
schemes for redistribution of wealth.´9 
Asserting to the compromises made towards the family unit, Christiane 
Eifert continues: ÄIn the years between the wars, family support programs 
were established in a number of European countries, either by the state or in 
industry. Such programs presupposed very broad social agreement that certain 
family structures ought to be supported and that Ǝthe familyƎ ought to be 
SURWHFWHGE\ZHOIDUHSROLFLHV´10 This consensus, which dates from between the 
two wars, was reinforced in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s because 
economically the state could afford its engagement, since the economies were 
running at full speed. Later in the 1970s, welfare structures were reinforced 
because of new realities after the Äoil shock´. 
The second maneuver, which supports the first, was the promise made to the 
materially deprived that a ÄKLVWRULF´ correction would be made. Namely the 
promise that revenue base of the poor would be stabilized and progressively 
incremented in order to attain a fairer redistribution of wealth. The policy adopt 
was a two-way process. The first approach was to increase revenue of the 
deprived by adopting economic policies that would create new jobs, and 
support incentives that would maintain the stock of existing jobs. The second, 
and more direct approach, was to have a strong public sector, which, by 
extension of public services, went to support the equilibrium of the job market. 
This move reinforced the union power, leading to better bargaining power by 
the unions; although this also meant prolonged periods industrial disputes. The 
end result was that the revenue base of the family, of the lower classes, was 
nominally protected. The cost of these measures was still considered affordable 
by the governing instances, rather than facing a social upheaval and a collapse 
of the social structure. Thus the stock of social capital, institutional and non- 
institutional, was capped from erosion. 
                                                 
9 Christiane EIFERT: Book Reviews, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 
1996), 181-183. See also: Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and 
France, 1914-1945. by Susan PEDERSEN, Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
10 EIFERT: op.cit.  
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This did not mean that the erosion of social capital was not taking place; it 
meant that cultural references were still those that were used a couple of decades 
before. The role of the family in society was continuously weakened but it was 
still playing the role attributed to it by the state. The lower classes, in particular, 
VXSSRUWHGWKHVWDWH¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGGLGQRWTXHVWLRQWKHDQQRXQFHGEHQHILWVRI
the welfare state. So the Ä*UDQGH ,OOXVLRQ´ was in good health and walking 
straight. The welfare state was not constructed to protect the poor. It is a 
universal system, which in principle protects everyone. Soon we were to realize 
the welfare state was a middleclass intuition paid for mainly by the lower classes. 
Globalization swept away the long-held illusions for good or for worse. 
Globalization and liberalization have always lurked around for sometime 
but kicked off in earnest in the early 1990s. From here onwards begins a 
process from which states all over the world, and especially in Europe, start to 
call into question their social engagements. Although there were ideological 
bases for this, as in the case of Thatcherism, in many cases two reasons were 
provide: the alarming increase in budget deficits, and the need to be 
competitive in global markets. Shrinivas Thahur from the University of 
Mumbai, India, simplifies the formula: ÄGlobalization is no bed of roses and 
UHTXLUHV WKH FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRPLF VWDWHVPDQVKLS WR SXUVXH D FRPSUHKHQVLYH
reforms programme and set up appropriate administrative machinery to 
H[HFXWH D VHULHV RI HFRQRPLF WDVNV 7KH VXFFHVV RI D FRXQWU\¶V JOREDOL]DWLRQ
programme depends on how it takes suitable steps to improve the investment 
climate domestically and is also able to attract foreign FDSLWDO´.11 
The reform of administrative structures meant the reassessment of 
budgetary priorities. It was argued that the main Äculprits´ causing run-away 
budget deficits were the welfare state in particular and the public sector in 
general. The state was portrayed as measly provider of public welfare, and this 
image of the state was regularly echoed by ÄRIILFLDO SXEOLFDWLRQV´ and 
ÄJXLGDQFH´ reports by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Britain and the United States of America who were the first to pass the 
laboratory test. With a spectacular rise in the federal deficit alarm bells started 
to ring. One notable publicist summarized the situation as follows: Gross 
interest on the debt, including interest on the Treasury debt in the Social 
Security and other trust-fund surpluses (which net interest subtracts), now 
claims over a third of on-budget revenue - something one associates with 
banana republics. As its share of spending has grown, it has become a force 
driving spending and deficits higher. That is, our deficits are feeding on 
themselves. Some economists argue that on-budget-deficit and gross-interest 
figures exaggerate the problem. But we must remember that Social Security's 
surplus is an obligation of the Treasury, which it must ultimately meet with 
                                                 
11 Shrinivas THAHUR: What is globalization? published online by Global Envision. January, 
2007. www.globalenvision.org/library/8/1402 (Date of retrieval 2007).  
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resources extracted from the private sector. As the GAO (General Audit Office) 
and others have warned, when Social Security eventually liquidates its surplus 
to pay benefits, the Treasury will have to pay that debt by taxing or borrowing 
from the public. The on-budget deficit measures the borrowing the Treasury 
does now; the real significance of the Social Security surplus (meaning a 
surplus of charges) is that it represents borrowing (or taxing) that the Treasury 
must do later.12 
The question of social security and where next become a political trap. On 
one side the deterioration of public finances cannot be neglected any longer, 
because if continued it could mean the bankruptcy of the State. On the other hand 
how does one go about reforming (for some cutting back) the welfare state in all 
its avatars. One specialist on the question, called to give his opinion to a 
Congressional forum, said the follow: Social Security faces a long-term deficit. 
Restoring long-term financial balance to Social Security is therefore necessary, 
but it is not necessary to destroy the program in order to save it ± especially since 
WKH6RFLDO6HFXULW\GHILFLW LVQRW WKHSULPDU\H[SODQDWLRQIRU WKHQDWLRQ¶V ORQJ-
term budget imbalance. The tax cuts and particularly the projected increases in 
Medicare and Medicaid are much more important factors.13 
This balanced declaration in the Congressional Forum partially sheds light 
on the quiz and quagmire of the welfare state. What was really happening at the 
time was a redistribution of wealth from the public (sector) to the private 
sector, and public budgets were being subjected to mounting pressures of 
resource crunch. The fact that pharmaceutical companies have high margins, 
and that they are not subject competition as in general market condition is one 
of the reasons why public deficits were higher than should be. But this fact 
should not cloud the fact that the social security system was supposed to be one 
of self-sufficiency. The main problem comes from the fact that it slowly 
became part of the general budget. In this way a false illusion was create unto 
ZKLFK ³EDGPDQDJHPHQW´ OHG WRJRYHUQPHQWGHILFLWV DOWKRXJK LQ VRPHFDVHV
this might be true. The true reason behind the near collapse of the system 
comes from the fact that both government and the social infra-structure became 
the instrument of the middle classes. The resulting ÄGRXEOHGHWRQDWLRQ´ of tax 
reductions and high social spending was the translation of the middle class 
aspiration of paying fewer taxes but at the same time enjoying the comfort 
provided by the State system.  
Due to the size of the middle classes, and their growing political and 
economic weight, winning elections could be possible only by a convergence to 
the centre. In this way, were it the Right or the Left that won the elections, it 
                                                 
12 John ATTARIAN: No time for gimmicks - cutting the budget deficit by reducing entitlement 
programs, National Review (biweekly), May 10, 1993, New York. 
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n9_v45/ai_13794070 (Date of retrieval 2007-01-18)  
13 Peter R. ORSZAG (The Brookings Institution): Budget Deficits, Social Security, and 
Younger Generations, House Budget Committee Forum, September 13, 2004, Washington. 
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was always the middle classes that celebrate the victory. Social security was 
always beneficial to the middle classes but more and more it became a highway 
for their needs. This control of social security regime produced spectacular 
results, they could educate themselves, have high quality medical services and 
enjoy a very prolonged retirement, all at the expense of the state, and for sure 
on the expense of the lower classes and the younger generations. George 
Miller, a fellow of the Royal College of Physicians, after investigation and due 
consideration on the matter, writes the following: ÄMy feeling is that the rich 
may have shifted a little of their wealth to their not-so-wealthy relatives, but that 
in relative terms what the poor have gained through welfare is a drop in the 
ocean. This all looks very odd when we are told that of a total public expenditure 
RIELOOLRQLQ-1985, social security and health accounted for more than 
ELOOLRQ7KHUHDVRQIRUWKHDSSDUHQW contradiction is that most of it goes back 
to where it came from. Since 1960 virtually the whole working population has 
been subject to tax, either at source or at the point of expenditure. The Family 
Expenditure Survey has shown that in 1986, income-in-kind from the use of the 
1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6HUYLFHDPRXQWHG WRDERXWD\HDU IRUHDFK IDPLO\ LQ the 
ERWWRPRILQFRPHDQG700 for those in the top 20%. Not much difference. 
)RUVWDWHHGXFDWLRQLWZHQWWKHRWKHUZD\SHU\HDUIRUHDFKIDPLO\LQWhe 
ZHDOWK\EXWRQO\IRUIDPLOLHVLQWKHERWWRP´.14 And he continues 
with this disturbing with this disturbing statement: ÄIn the years between 1930 
and 1932 the death rate in infants with unskilled fathers was 25% above the 
national average. In the period between 1988 and 1990 it was 51 % above the 
average. Nowhere can I find any assurance that the lowliest in our society are 
really being helped to catch up´.15  
After a recent study on a poor district of London, Madeleine Bunting, a 
panelist on the matter for Guardian newspaper had this comment to make: 
ÄInstead of being the engine of social democracy once envisaged, it has proved 
to be an engine of resentful alienation from the state. So postwar "progress" 
may have served the middle classes well, materially and socially - they've still 
got their social networks, which they use for personal advancement, status and 
companionship - but it has served the working class much less well. Their 
brightest offspring are adopted and well rewarded, but the networks and self-
respect of the communities from which they come have largely been 
destroyed´.16 One of the problems of the welfare state is that it is projected as a 
                                                 
14 George MILLER (Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians): Failure of the Welfare 
State, Reprinted from Land & Liberty, 1994. www.cooperativeindividualism.org/miller-
george_failure-of-the-welfare-state.html (Date of retrieval 2007-01-18). 
15 MILLER: op.cit. 
16 Madeleine BUNTING: Ignored, angry and anxious: the world of the white working class, 
The Guardian, Monday February 13, 2006, Britain. (The article is comment on a 12 year study 
conducted on the impacted of the welfare state on the local population of Tower Hamlets ± East 
London. The New East End: Kinship, Race and Conflict by Geoff DENCH, Kate GAVRON and 
Michael YOUNG is published by Profile, 2006, (Geoff Dench is a professor of sociology at 
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universal system but is designed to benefit mainly the middle classes. It is 
crafted in such a way that the rules and regulations are difficult to understand 
for those who are not initiated. And by culturally over glorifying ÄZRUN´, a 
moral hurdle is introduced to prohibit the lower classes from wholly benefiting 
from the welfare state. ÄThe evolution of the welfare state had turned it from a 
mutual aid society writ large into a complex, centralised and bureaucratic 
system, run by middle-class do-gooders, "those big-hearted ones who've got 
their own big houses and make these rules", as one interviewee put it. The 
system, it was felt, gave generously to those who put nothing into the pot, while 
making ordinary working people who did contribute feel like recipients of 
FKDULW\ZKHQGUDZLQJWKHLUHQWLWOHPHQWV´17 
The same is echoed from other quarters: ÄThe working class as a whole has 
rarely benefited unconditionally from advances in state welfare. Even the NHS, 
arguably the most popular part of all state welfare provision, disproportionally 
benefits the middle and upper classes. But for great tracts of state welfare 
provision, class, race and gender divisions were deliberately exacerbated as a 
means of exercising social control and undermining more generalized class 
FRQIOLFW´.18 Chris Jones (emeritus professor of social policy and social work at 
the University of Liverpool) continues, describing the difficulties faced by the 
lower-classes in attaining social cover: ÄWith colleagues from the University of 
Liverpool, I am interviewing a wide variety of users of state welfare. The very 
notion "user" has become problematic because so few are able to access any but 
the most minimal services from the state, despite acute need. We are continually 
regaled with accounts of ever more stringent eligibility criteria and humiliating 
processes which block access to state welfare. These realities, and the scandal of 
unclaimed benefits in this country, make so much of The New East End feel 
completely unreal. But what has further fuelled my deep unease with this study is 
that our research is revealing that in some of the poorest neighbourhoods the 
IDPLO\LVEHFRPLQJHYHUPRUHFHQWUDOWRZHOOEHLQJDVVWDWHZHOIDUHUHWUHDWV´.19  
The same conclusions were attained by Dr.Houtman (Erasmus University, 
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences): ÄThe welfare state is 
                                                                                                                      
Middlesex University and a fellow at the Young Foundation. Kate Gavron is a fellow at the 
Young Foundation and a vice-chair of the Runnymede Trust.) London.) 
http://society.guardian.co.uk/socialexclusion/comment/0,,1708369,00.html . 
17 The Guardian (Newspaper Wednesday February 8, 2006): Lost horizons, this is an extract 
from - he New East End - Kinship, Race and Conflict, co-authored by Geoff DENCH, Kate 
GAVRON and Michael YOUNG, and published by Profile Books,2006, London. 
http://society.guardian.co.uk/socialexclusion/story/0,,1704158,00.html (Date of retrieval 2007-
01-11). It has to be noted that Michael Young (Lord) was from the Conservative Party (U.K.) a 
key member of neo-liberal political clique, along with Lady Thatcher.  
18 Chris JONES (is emeritus professor of social policy and social work at the University of 
Liverpool): New Myths of the East End, The Socialist Review, April 2006. 
www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=9709 (Date of retrieval 2007-01-11). 
19 JONES: op.cit. 
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often considered a key working-class interest. Focusing on solidarity with the 
unemployed, this article explains why the working class nevertheless fails to 
support the welfare state more strongly than other classes. Drawing on 
insights from political sociology, data collected among the employed Dutch 
population in 1997 are analyzed. As class theory predicts, the workers' 
economic position predisposes them to support economic redistribution and 
social rights. However, the workers' limited tolerance for nonconformity, 
stemming from their limited cultural capital, predisposes them to apply strict 
criteria of deservingness´.20 This means the room for deception is greater 
than one would think. What one realizes is that there is a structural diversion 
of wealth from the families of the lower classes to the upper echelons. This 
was done by firstly through the welfare ÄGHGXFWLRQV´ made to the salaried 
income of less well-off. Secondly, by keeping salaries of the lower section 
under pressure. And finally by privatizing public services and thus letting the 
prices of these services to rise freely. 
Families in the lower strata depend sole on their labor for their income, 
unlike the middle classes who tend to diversify their revenue base. But the 
welfare state and system of social security in particular, funds itself from 
deductions made to salaried income. Thus the overall percentage of 
contribution is greater for the lower classes than for the rest of the society. But 
on the receiving side there is also a structural prejudice against the families 
from the lower classes. Apart from the complexities and cultural damnations 
faced by the claimants, described by Professor Chis Jones, they are unable to 
enjoy the pitfalls of their pensions because of the longevity gap. In the words of 
Professor John Ashton (NHS North West region director of public health-
Britain): ³The big inequality opening up is not just length of life, it is quality of 
life. A lot of working class people are living into their 70s but often with 
multiple conditions, compared with middle-class people who often get to their 
80s before problems emerge´.21  The 10 year gap, on average, is paid for by 
cumulative surpluses coming from the lower classes that die ten years earlier.22 
If, as is proposed by some European governments, the retirement age is hiked 
to 67 or 70 years, pension contribution by the poor would be nothing more than 
a pure extraction of additional taxes to ÄGLUHFWO\´ support the middle-class 
ÄVXUSOXV ORQJHYLW\´. This goes to show how the welfare state, designed to be 
                                                 
20 HOUTMAN D. (Erasmus University, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social 
Sciences,  Rotterdam, Holland): The working class and the welfare state support for economic 
redistribution, tolerance for nonconformity, and the conditionality of solidarity with the 
unemployed, published by The Netherlands journal of social sciences (Neth. j. soc. sci.) ISSN 
0924-1477, 2000.  
21 Professor John ASHTON (NHS North West region director of public health): What's the 
prognosis? The Guardian, Wednesday September 7, 2005. http://society.guardian.co.uk/ 
societyguardian/story/0,,1563674,00.html. 
22 Office of National Statistics (London): Life expectancy at 65 reaches record level, 
www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=168 (Date of retrieval 2007-01-19) 
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an institutional form of social capital to compensate for the loss of traditional 
form of social capital, is evolving towards a form of social Äneo-FRORQLDOLVP´.  
The situation in the United States was more direct, where the welfare state 
reached a new level. It was no longer a place for state solidarity for the 
deprived families. The Urban Institute (a think tank on social affairs in the 
USA) after reviewing the welfare reforms of 1990-2000 made the following 
statement: ÄWith the 1996 legislation, families with little or no income were no 
longer automatically entitled to welfare, and most states began to discourage 
welfare entry and require new beneficiaries to pursue paid work. States got 
incentives to encourage marriage and the formation of two-parent families and 
to reduce out-of-wedlock childbearing. The dramatic decline in the welfare 
caseload -- from 4.5 million families in 1996 to 2.1 million in 2002 -- was the 
PRVWVWXQQLQJRXWFRPH´.23 Statistics might have improved but maybe the same 
cannot be said of the plight of these families. By redirecting people towards 
family life, it seems that politicians have not heeded to the advice given to 
them by Francis Fukuyama: ÄPolicy makers also need to be aware that social 
capital, particularly when associated with groups that have a narrow radius of 
trust, can produce negative externalities and be detrimental to the larger 
VRFLHW\´24 Maybe he is asserting that people might find comfort in other things 
than consumerism.  
Second reason mentioned earlier, unto how social capital is destroyed 
structurally by economic imbalances, is by keeping salaries of the lower section 
under pressure. E. Ahmet Tonak (specialist on labor economics) after 
investigation, says the following: ÄThe main focus of this study is the role of 
the state in the distribution process vis-j-vis the working class in the United 
States during the period 1952-1980. This focus led me to formulate and then 
answer a question: what is the net impact of the distributive activities of the 
state on the wages of the working class as a whole and various segments within 
it? In order to deal with this question I proposed a concept, net-tax, which is 
taxes paid to the state minus benefits and income received from it. The 
empirical findings of the article concerning the net-tax paid by labor led me to 
call into question the economically beneficial role of the welfare state in 
UHODWLRQWRWKHZDJHVRIWKHZRUNLQJFODVV´.25 Ahmet Tonak, here, is speaking 
about the changes that were bought to wage structure. More of the salary 
income was going to support the welfare state than was before, and that the 
situation for the employers was the reverse.  
                                                 
23 The Urban Institute: A Decade of Welfare Reform: How Are Low-Income Families 
Faring? Posted to Web: August 30, 2006. www.urban.org/publications/900993.html (Date of 
retrieval 2007-01-15). 
24 FUKUYAMA: op.cit. 
25 E. Ahmet TONAK: The U.S. Welfare State and the Working Class, 1952-1980, published 
by Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 47-72 (1987).  
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This is not the only reason, as Tom Lewis of Globalpolicy explains: U.S. 
corporations extracted huge profits from almost every corner of the world in the 
1990s. But as the declining living conditions of U.S. workers show, these profits 
GLGQ¶W WULFNOH GRZQ WR LPSURYH WKHLU OLYHV « Downsizing, union-busting, 
benefit reductions, demands for labor flexibility and forced productivity gains 
were strategies used by U.S. corporations not only in foreign countries but also 
here at home to drain more out of workers.26 As mentioned earlier the state had 
tacitly assumed the role of protecting the interests of the workers without 
damaging those of the employers, by interposing itself as a mediator. 
But the wave of neo-liberalism of the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that 
the state renounced this role, some would say that it was siding with the 
employers against the interests of the lower classes by legislative 
deconstruction. Consequently, the destruction of union power meant that 
institutional form of social capital was eroding, along with the revenues of the 
poor. According to Vernellia R.Randall (Professor of Law, University of 
Dayton): ÄFrom 1977 to 1999, the after-tax income of the richest 20 percent of 
American families increased by 43 percent, while that of the poorest 20 percent 
decreased 9 percent, allowing for inflation. The actual income of those living 
on the lowest salaULHVZDVHYHQOHVVWKDQ\HDUVDJR´.27  
The state has foaled on one of its promise that there would be fair 
distribution of wealth, in exchange for legitimacy transferred to it. Serhat 
Salihoglu (writing for South-East Europe Review) sums up the situation well: 
ÄBased on the foregoing, we can say that the welfare state policies which were 
once built up so carefully are now being dismantled step-by-step. Turkey is 
going through a deep social crisis.28 The privatization of the public sector, the 
opening up of public services to global competition, the collapse of public 
finances and the flexibility of the labor market have nullified welfare state 
policies. Savage global competition has proved to be a massive danger to trade 
union and social security rights in general. Furthermore, solutions to 
µXQHPSOR\PHQW¶ZKLFKLVDVLJQLILHURIVRFLDOGHSUHVVLRQDUHEHLQJDEDQGRQHG
WRWKHµKLGGHQKDQG¶RIWKHPDUNHW´.29  
                                                 
26 Tom LEWIS: The Growing Gap Between Rich and Poor, Socialist Worker, August 1, 
2003. Published online by Globalpolicy.org/ www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/inequal/2003/ 
0801gap.htm  (Date of retrieval 2007-01-19). 
27 Vernellia R. RANDALL (Professor of Law, University of Dayton): Widening Gap 
Between Rich and Poor and Deteriorating Situation of Worker's Economic and Social Rights, 
http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrights/georegions/northamerica/china03.htm . 
28 The reader has to be alerted to the fact that Turkey suffered deep financial crisis both in the 
1990s and 2002, after which both the IMF and the World Bank imposed strict long term 
budgetary reforms in exchange of short-term credit. This meant privitization of public services 
and the rollback of the welfare state, dating back to the times Kemal Atturk, the founding father 
of the Turiksh Republic. 
29 Serhat SALIHOGLU: Welfare state policies in Turkey, South-East Europe Review, April 
2002, 21-26 
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Commenting on the long-awaited ÄTackling Health Inequalities: Status 
Report on the Programme for Action´ by the Ministry of Health (Britain- 
August 11th, 2005); and its findings that the life expectancy between the poor 
and the rich had increased by 10 years, Geoff Rayner, an Academic and former 
chair of the UK Public Health Association, had the following to say: ÄWhat's 
so different about now, compared to when the Black Report came out, is that 
we live in a consumer society. There is no language of paternalism any more. 
The government has adopted the language of the market to sell public health 
policy as well as buying into a philosophy of the market. The state - as opposed 
to governments - needs to protect people, and we need a state structure for 
intervention that is agreed upon, one that doesn't change with a government or 
DQHZKHDOWKPLQLVWHU´.30 
And finally, there has been a progressive migration of income from low-
income families to the high end of the spectrum by the privatization of public 
services. This was done by privatization of public utilities and letting the prices 
of services provided by these utilities to rise, denting by a large margin the 
already reduced incomes of the poorer families. Let us limit our analysis to 
water which is of fundamental importance for human existence. Historically, 
water has been viewed as a public good, not a market commodity. Over the last 
200 years, most water utilities have been publicly owned and managed. And, 
the vast majority of people around the world receive water and sanitation 
services from publicly owned and operated facilities.31 But, as mentioned 
before, the neo-liberal coalition lead by the IMF and the World Bank pressured 
governments all over the world into privatization of public utilities under the 
banner of ÄEHWWHU PDQDJHPHQW DQG HIILFLHQF\´: Privatization is on the rise. 
More than 8,500 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in over 80 countries have 
been privatized in the past 12 years, 2,000 in countries that borrow from the 
World Bank.32 Public Citizen (Watch dog and protest group based in 
Washington D.C.) came up with historic evidence to prove the neo-liberals 
wrong: ÄThe claim that the multinational water corporations will save 
government money by providing more efficient and cost-effective operation, 
maintenance and rehabilitation of water and sanitation services is also not 
borne out in practice. Instead, the cases presented below show increases in 
consumer water rates, public health crises, weak regulation, lack of investment 
                                                 
30 The Guardian (Daily): What's the prognosis? Wednesday September 7, 2005. 
http://society.guardian.co.uk/societyguardian/story/0,,1563674,00.html (Date of retrieval 
2007-01-16). 
31 $ VSHFLDO UHSRUW E\ 3XEOLF &LWL]HQ¶V :DWHU IRU $OO SURJUDP Water Privatization 
Fiascos: Broken Promises and Social Turmoil. March 2003, Washington D.C., Public Citizen 
online publication, page. www.citizen.org/documents/privatizationfiascos.pdf  (Date of 
retrieval 2007-01-20). 
32 World Bank: Privatization: eight lessons of experience, Outreach #3, Policy Views from 
the Country Economics Department, July 1992 ± Washington DC. www.worldbank.org/ 
html/prddr/outreach/or3.htm (Date of retrieval 2007-01-20).  
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in water infrastructure, jobs and trade unions threatened, pollution and other 
environmental catastrophes, secret deals and social turmoil´.33 
Britain, under the leadership Margaret Thatcher, was the first to privatize 
water companies, which operated as 10 regional monopolies. The evidence 
there is not one of economic efficiency but more theft and extraction: ÄOn 
average, prices rose by over 50% in the first 4 years. The first 9 years 
produced price increases of 46% in real terms (adjusted for inflation). The 
SXEOLF ZDV IXUWKHU RXWUDJHGZKHQ LQIRUPDWLRQZDV UHOHDVHG DERXW GLUHFWRU¶V
pay and the profits of the 10 water companies. The real value of the fees, 
VDODULHVDQGERQXVHVSDLGWRWKHGLUHFWRU¶VLQFUHDVHGEHWZHHQDQG
in most of the water companies. The profits of the 10 water companies rose 
147% between 1990 and 1997. Profit margins in the UK are typically three or 
even four times as great as the margins of water companies in France, Spain, 
Sweden or Hungary´.34 Although Britain has a water industry watch dog ± 
Ofwat (the Office of Water Services) apparently it was not ÄHIILFLHQW´ enough 
to regulate the price rises for customers.35 In turn, as public body, the work of 
Ofwat is overseen by the British Parliament and the British Government. This 
shows how far the state is disengaging itself to the detriment of the poor and 
institutional social capital. The Daily Mail sums it up best. Ä«7KH ZDWHU
industry has become the biggest rip-off in Britain. Water bills, both to 
households and industry, have soared. And the directors and shareholders of 
%ULWDLQ¶V WRS WHQ ZDWHU FRPSDQLHV KDYH EHHQ DEOH WR XVH WKHLU SRVLWLRQ DV
monopoly suppliers to pull off the greatest act of licensed robbery in our 
history. (July 11, 1994).´36 By stressing the words licensed robbery the news 
paper stresses the involvement of the state ± the middle class state. 
The family, as a concept of basic social organization, has also suffered from 
cultural libertarianism ± a consequence of a perverse definition of liberal 
democracy. Reginald W Bibby, from the University of Lethbridge and one of 
Canada's foremost sociologists, argues that baby boomers (born between 1946 
and 1965) have emphasized individualism, consumerism, and pluralism to the 
GHWULPHQW RI FRPPXQLW\ OLIH DQG WKH FRPPRQ JRRG 3HUVRQDO IUHHGRP «
ranked above family life, friendship, religious involvement, career, etc.37 In the 
United states for example, the proportion of married people, especially among 
younger age groups, has been declining for decades. According to Sam 
                                                 
33 $VSHFLDOUHSRUWE\3XEOLF&LWL]HQ¶V:DWHUIRU$OOSURJUDPop.cit. 
34 Public Citizen, op.cit. 
35 Water price rises are regulated by Ofwat, which reviews charges every five years. During 
these reviews water companies submit their plans for the next five years and justify their 
proposed price increases. Ofwat then reviews these suggested prices and decides upon a water 
price rise that is acceptable to both customers and the water companies. 
36 Public Citizen, op.cit. 
37 Dr. Reginald W BIBBY: The Boomer Factor: What Canada's Most Famous Generation is 
Leaving Behind, Project Canada Books, Lethbridge, 2006. For diverses books and comments by 
Dr.Bibby go to: http://reginaldbibby.com/bookordering.html (Date of retrieval 2007).  
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Roberts, between 1950 and 2000, the share of women 15-to-24 who were 
married plummeted to 16 percent, from 42 percent. Among 25-to-34-year-olds, 
the proportion dropped to 58 percent, from 82 percent.38 Among the more than 
117 million women over the age of 15, according to the marital status category 
LQ WKH &HQVXV %XUHDX¶V ODWHVW $PHULFDQ &RPPXQLW\ 6XUYH\  PLOOLRQ DUH
married. Of those, 3.1 million are legally separated and 2.4 million said their 
husbands were not living at home for one reason or another. That brings the 
number of American women actually living with a spouse to 57.5 million, 
compared with the 59.9 million who are single or whose husbands were not 
living at home when the survey was taken in 2005.39 
$VWRSHRSOH¶VLQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDOHQJDJHPHQWRQRIWKHEDVLFWHQHWVRIVRFLDO
capital, the figures for the United States are very revealing: ÄA 1987 survey of 
nearly 1,460 adults who did not yet have children found 85 percent intended to 
have children. When the study group was revisited six years later, only 30 
percent of respondents who said they desired children had one. Respondents 
who were childless six years later said they still ZDQWHGFKLOGUHQ´.40 This dire 
picture turns even worse when we look at the statistics for responsibility of 
couples for their children. As Gordon Neal Diem (Assistant Professor of 
Political Science, North Carolina Central University) warns: ÄIn many nations, 
and in many American states, the failure to procreate is grounds for divorce 
RU DQQXOPHQW RI WKH PDUULDJH DQG GLVVROXWLRQ RI WKH IDPLO\ « ,Q VWDWH-
enacted marital and divorce law, the economic obligations among family 
members insure that children and women are prevented from becoming the 
financial responsibility of the state. Again, the needs of the state define family 
DQGIDPLO\REOLJDWLRQV´.41 
This dissolution of the family also has dramatic consequences on 
intergenerational solidarity. As explained earlier the welfare state is 
progressively being folded back. The situation is that in the absence of state 
solidarity, old people have turn to their families for help. But the traditional 
protective structures of the family no longer exist. Economically,  as Sam 
Roberts explained one in two families can no longer be considered viable to 
provide intergenerational support. ³7KLV LV\HWDQRWKHURI WKH LQH[RUDEOHVLJQV
that there is no going back to a world where we can assume that marriage is 
                                                 
38 Sam ROBERTS: 51% of Women Are Now Living Without Spouse, article in the New York 
Times, January 16, 2007. www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/us/16census.html?pagewanted=2&ei 
=5094&en=47985bda8ea9f048&hp&ex=1169010000&partner=homepage (Date of retrieval 
2007-01-16). 
39 ROBERTS: op.cit. 
40 Marjorie CORTEZ (Deseret News staff writer): Family structure changes as lives grow 
busier, Deseret News, 01/29/1998. URL: http://deseretnews.com/misc/growth/29side1.htm (Date 
of retrieval 2007-01-15).  
41 Gordon Neal DIEM (Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Carolina Central 
University): The Definition of "Family" in a Free Society, published by the Libertarian Nation 
Foundation, http://libertariannation.org/a/f43d1.html (date of retrieval 2007-01-15).  
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the main institutiRQWKDWRUJDQL]HVSHRSOH¶VOLYHV´ said Prof. Stephanie Coontz, 
director of public education for the Council on Contemporary Families, a 
nonprofit research group. ÄMost of these women will marry, or have married. 
But on average, Americans now spend half their adult lives outside 
PDUULDJH´42 The family as a social pillar, and as an inter-generational support, 
is being slowly eliminated.  
Dame Denise's (House of Lords, Britain) warning came in the annual report 
of the Commission for Social Care Inspection. ÄIt warned that 70% of local 
authorities are limiting home care services to people who are so frail they need 
help to get out of bed or cannot cook a hot meal for themselves. Those who face 
"moderate" difficulties such as mobility problems or depression due to 
isolation do not qualify for help, and have to rely on family and friends or pay 
for private care themselves. Councils forecast that by 2009, every authority 
will have tightened rules so that only those with severe needs qualify for state 
KHOS´43 This call was made to show not only the plight of the elderly but the 
burden faced by the families of these elderly.  
But neo-liberal reformers do not heed to reality. Fukuyama for one thinks, 
by relegating family to ranks of social paganism, that new structures like civil 
society will do the trick: ÄIn the absence of civil society, the state often needs 
to step in to organize individuals who are incapable of organizing themselves. 
The result of excessive individualism is therefore not freedom, but rather the 
tyranny of what Tocqueville saw as a large and benevolent state that hovered 
over society and, like a father, saw to all of its needs. Low levels of social 
capital lead to a number of political dysfunctions, which have been extensively 
GRFXPHQWHG´.44 Fukuyama forgets that it was the liberals that declared 
individualism to being a liberating force, leading to breakdown of the family. 
Robert Putman pointed out that liberal spending programmes have all often 
served to support the individual at the cost of collective social capital. 
3XWQDP¶VDUJXPHQWVDQWLFLSDWHRQHRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQVRIVRFLDOFDSLWDOWKHRU\
where policymakers justify reduced public spending on the basis that social 
capital is the crucial form of capital, and cannot be reinforced by financial 
support.45 This explains why Fukuyama entered the debate on ÄVRFLDOFDSLWDO´. 
The systematic attack on the ÄIDPLO\´ is not an isolated affair; this attack is 
also extended against the notion of ÄFRPPXQLW\´ as we know it today. By 
proposing new replacements to the concept of community neo-liberalism and 
its mercenaries like Francis Fukuyama want to deal a final blow to the 
                                                 
42 ROBERTS: op.cit. 
43 John CARVEL and Lucy WARD: Social care system 'failing older people', The Guardian, 
Thursday January 11, 2007. www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1987315,00.html (Date of 
retrieval 2007-01-16). 
44 FUKUYAMA: op.cit. 
45 Robert D. PUTMAN: The prosperous community: social capital and public life. Published 
by American Prospect, 1993. 5. 
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remaining structures of community bonds. We have long known that liberal 
democracy, as a political ideology, is the other face of neo-liberalism and 
has the devastating effects on the community and its ability to control its 
political future. The practice of liberal democracy was to reinforce the 
national community by giving the instances of government true legitimacy. 
In reality it has become an exercise of ÄVHOHFWLRQ RI WKH JRYHUQLQJ HOLWH´ 
ZLWKRXWUHDOLQFLGHQFHRQSHRSOH¶Vwishes or wellbeing.46 Social capital was 
the cradle of democracies everywhere and overtime this has been eroded. 
Like in the case of the family true democracy is cornered by liberal 
economic policies- the material assets which upheld democracy no longer 
exist, so it cannot be exercised.  
The stringency of (World Bank-IMF) Liberal democracy has thus turned 
democracy into an empty promise. The way this was done is as follows: Firstly 
by transforming the citizen and community member into a consumer. And 
secondly by progressively eliminating protest and contention, or the capacity of 
the citizen to call into question the economic and political agenda of the elite. 
In most cases economic ideology is standardized by the world economic 
instances like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organization. Individual consumerism overrides common good. Annual 
GDP growth is favored instead of long-term human development and economic 
sustainability. ÄOrganization´ is preferred to community. Now let us examine 
theses tendencies in detail. 
The community distinguishes itself from the family by taking over those 
responsibilities which the family is unable to. If we look at social institutions 
like marriage, traditions varied from one geographic region to another, but in 
most cases the parents of the groom went to the neighboring villages to 
search for a bride. This was done to avoid genetic deficiencies and conflicts 
of social proximity. Whatever the immediate reason, the result was that 
families and villages were interconnected. This proves that isolation did not 
exist and it also proves that the interconnecting bonds were sufficiently 
strong enough to produce solidarity even across several villages ± 
encompassing a whole region.  Dr. Opler, Professor of Anthropology and 
Director of India Program at Cornell University, has gathered evidence to this 
account: ÄA villager in India, besides being a member of a distinguishable 
local community and interacting with many of its other members, has 
important ties of a more extensive nature, and participates in practices and 
understandings and characteristics of wider areas. In discussions of the 
independence, viability and future of the Indian village it may be useful to 
keep the nature of these ties to the outside in mind and to consider their past 
KLVWRU\ DQG WKH SUHVHQW WUHQGV LQ UHVSHFW WR WKHP« 7DNLQJ DV H[DPSOH D
northern Indian village, the author continues) In the first place Senapur does 
                                                 
46 See Raymond ARON: 'pPRFUDWLHHWWRWDOLWDULVPH Gallimard, Paris 1965. 
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not stand alone. It is one of a cluster of villages covering a seventy square 
PLOHDUHDZKLFKKDYHWUDGLWLRQVRIDFRPPRQRULJLQDQGGHVFHQW´.47  
These social bonds are further increased by economic rationality in areas 
like local infrastructure, such as the building of complex water systems to 
distribute water for irrigation purpose. The sharing of woods and commons for 
the rearing of domestic animals are all examples of strong social interaction 
and mutual dependence. The only person to be isolated, without the inflow of 
new ideas, seems to Francis Fukuyama. Maybe earning excessive royalties and 
grants from reputed international agencies give him the opportunity to enjoy 
such isolation, but a villager laboring his fields cannot afford it. He for one 
needs constant interaction for survival. 
Traditional social capital has thus survived hundreds of years of political 
upheavals because it is deeply rooted in the idea of solidarity and social 
harmony exclusive of immediate economic gains and profits. As such, this 
form of social capital is a real GDP buster. After slowly wiping out the rain 
forests, converting the whole urban world into a hypermarket, and build-bash-
build policies, neo-liberals do not know where the next GDP-explosion is going 
to come from. From the 1990s onwards, with the disappearance of the socialist 
bloc, it has dawned upon them that: after all their efforts solidarity still 
represents a big chunk of the socio-economic relations between individuals and 
communities, in comparison to the economy controlled by the Ä0DUNHW´. 
Furthermore,  disregarding the daily consumptions, important investments like 
health and education are still community based, and not do not enter the world 
of commercial transactions.  
Another mistrust of traditional social capital is that village life is self-
sufficient and self-sustaining. One newspaper comes to the defense of small 
communities: ÄThe world is beginning to understand the importance of living 
close to nature. Global warming, depleting ozone layer, extinction of millions 
of plants and animal species, and ravages followed by the tsunami, the super 
cyclone, landslips, floods and droughts in different parts of the world have led 
SHRSOHWRVHHNFRPIRUWLQWKLQJVVPDOODQGEHDXWLIXO´.48 The Green Party of the 
United States of America came to similar conclusion when it decided on the 
following as its political platform: ÄNo economic system is sustainable unless it 
accommodates the ecosystems on which it depends. Our current system - based 
on the notion of perpetual economic expansion on a finite planet - is seriously 
flawed. We urgently need to apply human ingenuity to the goal of using far less 
                                                 
47 Morris E. OPLER: The Extensions of an Indian Village, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
16, No. 1 (Nov., 1956), pp. 5-10. Dr. Opler is Professor of Anthropology and Director of India 
Program at Cornell University. He is the author of books and papers dealing with the culture of 
American Indian groups, Japan, and India.  
48 Sudhansu R. DAS: Globalising the Indian village, The Hindu Business Line (internet 
edition), Nov 30 2005. www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/11/30/stories/ 
2005113000781100.htm (date of etrieval 2007-01-13). 
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from nature to meet our needs, which is a different goal from exploiting nature 
and Third World people so that we can meet the invented and implanted false 
"needs" that advertisers continually push at us in a grow-or-die type of 
economy. We need to acquire the ability to distinguish between need and greed, 
in spite of what the media assure us we "need." We also need to restore a 
progressive tax structure, rather than continuing to move money toward the top 
HFKHORQVRIVRFLHW\ZKLOHVTXHH]LQJHYHU\RQHHOVH´.49 
Translating the wishes of the Green Party of the United States into reality 
means that goods and services are locally produced, exchanged and consumed. 
This leaves very little scope for outside market interferences, and its 
externalities such as pollution and biodegradation. But this economic structure 
represents a big obstacle for GDP growth. This Änon-growth´ appears namely 
at three levels: on the level of surplus capital formation, the economic 
exploitation of negative externalities and the loss of fiscal control by the State. 
The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
gives this recipe to ÄHQKDQFH´ growth and fiscal revenues. It says that the state 
should go after those activities which the market does not cover: ÄThe term 
³1RQ-2EVHUYHG (FRQRP\´ 12( UHIHUV WR WKRVH HFRQRPLF DFWLYLWLHV ZKLFK
should be included in the GDP but which, for one reason or another, are not 
covered in the statistical surveys or administrative records from which the 
QDWLRQDODFFRXQWVDUHFRQVWUXFWHG´.50 After enumerating extensively the ways 
in which the state should act, the report continues as follows: ÄA third 
component is the production of goods for own use. This is usually perfectly 
legal and there is no reason for producers to conceal their activities. It may be 
omitted from the national accounts only because there are no observable 
transactions between sellers and purchasers since they are one and the same. 
In OECD countries, construction and maintenance of dwellings is probably the 
most important example of production for own use. In transition and 
developing countries growing ones own food is another important activity. 
Following the collapse of Communism in the early 1990s, small scale crop 
production became an essential survival strategy in most transition countries 
and may have accounted for up to half of total agricultural output in some 
FRXQWULHV´.51 If one understands this logic to its full scope, planting vegetables 
in your front garden for your consumption or pleasure is tantamount to Äanti-
VWDWH´ activity and against progress, in GDP terms. 
It was Dr. E. F. Schumacher who tried, in the 1960s and 1970s, to point to 
the danger of abstracts like GDP, which can have a devastating effect on social 
                                                 
49 Green Party of the United States: Platform Preamble, 2004. www.gp.org/platform/2004/ 
economics.html (Date of retrieval 2007-01-13) 
50 Derek BLADES and David ROBERTS: Measuring the non-observed economy, published 
by OECD Statistics Brief, November 002, Issue No. 5, page 4. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
16/16/2389461.pdf (Date of retrieval 2007-01-13). 
51 BLADES- ROBERTS: op.cit. 
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capital and community life: ÄAll important insights are missed if we continue 
to think of development mainly in quantitative terms and in those vast 
abstractions ± like GNP, investment, savings, etc. ± which have their usefulness 
in the study of developed countries but have virtually no relevance to 
development problems as such. (Nor did they play the slightest part in the 
actual development of the rich countries!«7KHFRPPRQFULWHULRQRIVXFFHVV
namely the growth of GNP, is utterly misleading and, in fact, must of necessity 
OHDG WR SKHQRPHQD ZKLFK FDQ RQO\ EH GHVFULEHG DV QHRFRORQLDOLVP´.52 
Although Dr. Schumacher was making his arguments in the context of ÄNorth-
6RXWK´ divide, after 30 years since his statement the same could be said of the 
situation inside any country pursuing liberal economic policies: it is neo-
colonialism inside one country. Since economic resources, both labor and 
natural, move only in one direction ± upward.  
So the project of the Ä:DVKLQJWRQ &RQVHQVXV´ and its mercenaries like 
Fukuyama is to bust and bankrupt the vehicles of solidarity and mutual 
dependence, and replace them with outright dependence on ÄUHQW FROOHFWLQJ´ 
systems. The entire debate on social capital from Coleman to Fukuyama is 
situated it in the arid sphere of metaphorical and conceptual patchwork. 
Although this debated is very important in the conceptualization of Äsocial 
FDSLWDO´ for the purpose of public debate, and in some aspect to observe the 
social patterns of human behavior. Disregarding the physical attributes or 
vehicles of social capital will bring about a distortion in its definition. Such a 
distortion cannot be accepted from a historical perspective because it means 
removing the main components of it. The question one has to ask is: Can Social 
Capital exist without its physical and structural attributes? The answer is no! 
Historically cities, by the concentration of political and economic power 
that they represent, have become places where political debates and 
contestation takes place. For the celebrated American urbanist - Richard 
Sennett, the most important element of exchange in the city is talk. ÄUrban 
space is also the turf that people have fought for and in some way suffered for. 
,W LV PHDQLQJIXO EHFDXVH VRPHWKLQJ KDSSHQV WKHUH SROLWLFDOO\´53 Sennett 
focuses on the tension between the public and private realms in which we live, 
arguing that different types of behaviour and activity are appropriate in each. 
ÄHe believes that the barrier between these different realms has been eroded, 
through capitalism and the secularization of society, and that this breakdown is 
so profound that public man has been left with no certain idea of his role in 
                                                 
52 E.F.SCHUMACHER: Small is Beautiful-A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, 
published by Sphere Books Ltd (ABACUS edition), 1974, London 162. 
53 %R*5g1/81'The Civitas of Seeing and the Design of Cities - on the urbanism of 
Richard Sennett, The text was written as an introduction to a seminar on Richard Sennett: 
'Transformations of the concept of urbanity', at the Urban Design Department at the School of 
Architecture in Copenhagen in the spring of 1997. http://hjem.get2net.dk/gronlund/ 
Sennett_ny_tekst_97kort.html  (Date of retrieval 2007-01-11) 
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society.´54 The notion of active citizen has been progressively replaced by the 
notion of active consumer, squeezing out democratic debate in the process. 
D. Champlin for one argues that «Äprivatization of goods such as public 
safety, education or community recreation may result in more spatially limited 
social capital, where individuals are less willing to cooperate for the common 
good. Shrinking the spatial dimensions of "community" to include only 
members of the same housing development or neighborhood may impose other 
costs to local governments that offset the expected savings from 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ´.55 Frederique Krupa  Architect and Urban activist from the 
University of Arts ± Philadelphia sees it as follows: ÄPerhaps more important 
than the loss of social ideals is the loss of basic democratic rights. Beyond 
losing the "freedom of the city," in its anonymity and tolerance, the 
privatization of traditional public spaces such as streets in gated Los Angeles 
communities or the town center in the Mall of America severely limit free 
speech and assembly. Where could a revolution occur now that the privately-
owned mall has become the substitute town center for most people? The 
Supreme Court upheld a decision in 1972 giving mall owners the right to limit 
access to their private property if someone or some activity was considered 
GHWULPHQWDO WR FRQVXPSWLRQ´.56 In this way protest in defense of community 
YDOXHVLVFRQVWULFWHGWRRQH¶VOLYLQJURRP, comfortable but not productive.  
Different processes have combined in this dissolution ± in particular, 
attempts to privatise and marketise public services have been combined with 
attempts to de-politicise the public realm. Shirley Kressel argues that Ä« 
privatization of public space also represents a more fundamental elite agenda. 
Privatization of the public realm substitutes the private corporation for public 
institutions as the repository of trust, legitimacy, and communal identity in our 
society. By acts of custodianship and gift-giving, by naming socially-significant 
institutions with corporate names, by substituting company logos for official 
flags, the private sector subverts the idea of democracy and the public good «. 
The privatization of public space is part of a pattern which includes the 
privatization and corporate invasion of public schools, the proposed 
privatization of Social Security, the corporate takeover of health care, and 
other policies geared to define our lives and our society in terms of corporate 
QHHGVDQGFRUSRUDWHSRZHU´.57 And she continues: ÄWhen private agendas of 
stratification and control are imposed on those places, the very heart of 
                                                 
54 *5g1/81D: op.cit. 
55 CHAMPLIN D.: Social capital and the privatization of public goods, International Journal 
of Social Economics, Volume 26, Number 10, 1999, 1302-1314(13), Published by Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited (Bradford, UK). 
56 Frederique KRUPA (University of Arts ± Philadelphia): The Privatization of Public Space, 
MA thesis ± Spring 1993. 
57 Shirley KRESSEL (is a landscape architect): Privatizing the Public Realm, published in 
New Democracy Newsletter, July-August 1998, Boston. www.newdemocracyworld.org/ 
space.htm (Date of retrieval 2007-01-12). 
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democratic principle is threatened. Democracy cannot survive when we have 
no place to gather where there is Ǝno purchase necessaryƎ. Democracy cannot 
survive substituting property rights for civil rights. Democratic principle 
FDQQRWVXUYLYHVXERUGLQDWLQJFLWL]HQVKLSWRFRQVXPHULVP´.58  
It seems that the local authorities not always take into consideration the 
aspiration of the local inhabitants let alone the calls of civic activists. Local 
Authorities often put on a positive ÄVSLQ´ to avoid alerting the general public. 
The city of Leicester recently explained the sale of public spaces to developers 
in the following: ÄThe city of Leicester is changing. The physical fabric of the 
city is evolving as new developments and city initiatives are realised. A major 
opportunity for the city of Leicester to re-define its public realm has been the 
redevelopment and expansion proposals of the Shires Shopping Centre. The 
New Shires is set to open in October 2008. The Council, in response to this 
redevelopment, has undertaken to embark upon a three-year public realm 
improvement programme which, combined with major retail and commercial 
LQYHVWPHQWZLOOUHJHQHUDWHDQGWUDQVIRUPWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIWKHFLW\FHQWUH´.59 
Indeed! In truth what happens is that city centers are no longer free for all. 
Previously public spaces are turned into commercial strongholds, where only 
middle class citizens with money can entertain themselves. But this leaves out 
the poorer sections of the population. Hanging around public places was one 
way young people could meet and exchange ideas on all aspects of society. 
Brendan Gleeson (Griffith University, Bribane-Australia) after extensive 
research came to this conclusion: ÄPublic spheres are where all citizens - 
irrespective of socioeconomic or cultural background - are welcome and where 
the rules and norms that are fundamental to democracy are cherished. 
Importantly, the public realm is a sort of "civic school" which newcomers (the 
young, migrants) and outsiders (such as gated communities) can experience 
and learn key democratic values, such as tolerance, equality of treatment and 
mutual obligation´.60 In short learn to become a democratic citizen. 
Increasingly as young and neglected do not have access to public spheres, 
along with the helping hand of the state, they rightly feel excluded. Fukuyama 
and neo-liberal politicians should realize it is not expounded individualism, 
traditionalists or family centric individuals that are putting in danger people¶V 
faith in democracy. Madeleine Bunting from the Guardian, commenting on 
spontaneous theatrical performances in public spaces, gives the following 
                                                 
58 KRESSEL: op.cit. 
59 Leicester City Council: Public Realm Strategy ± The Big Picture ( in this document 
Leicester City Council proposes to define its city center development strategy). 
www.leicester.gov.uk/your-council--services/ep/business--the-economy/big-picture/streets-and-
spaces/prs (Date of retrieval 2007-01-12). 
60 Brendan GLEESON (is Professor of Urban Management and Policy and Director of the 
Urban Research Program at the School for Environmental Planning at Griffith University, 
Brisbane.): $ FLW\¶V KHDOWK LV GHSHQGHQW XSRQ WKDW RI WKH SXEOLF UHDOP published by On Line 
Opinion. www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3316 (Date of retrieval 2007-01-12).  
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warning: ÄPoliticians bred on GDP and productivity statistics need to take 
notice of how the arts inspire collective experience in a way that our political 
languages no longer can. That means culture and its funding is no longer an 
add-on but central to any politics committed to the vitality of the public realm 
and how societies build collective purpose. In key areas such as identity, where 
emotions are raw and intense, culture of all kinds is a vital arena in which to 
explore hopes and defuse fears before the latter take violent or political 
IRUP´.61 The riots in Paris, autumn 2005, show how civic education and the 
lack public domain can unleash destruction and communal violence. As these 
situations showed it was communities and strong sense of family bonds, along 
with the idea of common purpose that helped calm the situation. But Fukuyama 
disagrees: ÄThe vice of modern democracy is to promote excessive 
individualism, that is, a preoccupation with one's private life and family, and 
an unwillingness to engage in public affairV´.62  
7RGD\¶V FRPPXQLWLHV DOO RYHU WKH ZRUOG DUH SROLWLFDO DQG HFRQRPLF
dislocations. Socially and culturally communities in general have maintained 
their identity, but decisions concerning the overall running of these 
communities are taken somewhere else or the functioning is standardized to 
such a degree that it does not take into account the local specificities. This 
leads to discrepancy in the formation, and overall cohesion of the Republic. 
The new tendency is to push fiscal pressure to the lower levels and adjoining 
this pressure with that of the level of services provided at the local level 
without paying attention to the quality of services provided. The framework 
that is handed down is that of private enterprises. In the words of Francis 
Fukuyama: ÄVirtually all economic activity, from running a laundry to 
building the latest generation microprocessor, is carried out not by individuals 
but by organizations that require a high degree of social cooperation. As 
economists argue, the ability to form organizations depends on institutions like 
SURSHUW\ ULJKWV FRQWUDFWV DQG D V\VWHP RI FRPPHUFLDO ODZ´.63 Fukuyama¶V 
tendency to compare work place to that of other social organization lies at 
borders of naivety or extreme cynicism. Unfortunately, the logic of modern 
entrepreneurialism does not always fit well with that of social capital. 
The purpose of the public and that of private sector differ considerably: 
ÄActing in the public interest requires consideration of natural, social, and 
economic systems. Natural systems provide the context and sustenance for 
                                                 
61 Madeleine BUNTING: Culture, not politics, is now the heart of our public realm, The 
Guardian, Tuesday October 3, 2006. www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,,1886126,00. 
html (Date of retrieval 2007-01-12). 
62 FUKUYAMA: op.cit.  
63 Francis FUKUYAMA: Social Capital and the Global Economy: A Redrawn Map of the 
World, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1995 issue. www.foreignaffairs.org/ 
19950901faessay5067/francis-fukuyama/social-capital-and-the-global-economy-a-redrawn-map-
of-the-world.html (Date of retrieval 2006-09-05). 
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social systems and, therefore, must be respected, nurtured, and sustained. 
6RFLDOV\VWHPVSURYLGHWKHFRQWH[WDQGSXUSRVHRIHFRQRPLFV\VWHPV´.64 In the 
past 20 years what the neo-liberal dogma has done is to turn the tables ± 
according to this the purpose of the public realm is to support the private sector 
at the detriment of the community. The French daily ± Le Tribune, reported 
WKDW WKH )UHQFK VWDWH VSHQW ¼ ELOOLRQ  of GDP) in financial support for 
private companies,65 while public deficit for the year did not exceed 3.5%.66 
This is a strange interpretation of social capital. The State might argue that, to 
weaver the hardships caused by globalization, national companies need 
financial subsidies. But the reality and functioning of these same companies 
points other directions: ÄAs corporations grew and as absentee owners 
(shareholders) became the primary corporate stakeholders, the public interest 
dimension became subordinate to the goal of maximizing shareholder (owner) 
wealth. Ultimately, in most capitalist societies, not only did the corporations 
DEGLFDWHDQ\SUHWH[W RI DFWLQJ LQ WKHEURDGHU SXEOLF¶V LQWHUHVW EXWDOVR WKHLU
responsibility to shareholders has been effectively outsourced «´.67 While 
Fukuyama pleads for greater participation of individuals and bare more public 
burdens in the process, the private sector is left free to ÄZKHHODQGGHDO´ itself 
into Äcasino-HFRQRPLFV´.  
Tradition as a factor of communal interaction, and of social capital, is not in 
opposition with structures of the Republic and State. Geographical and social 
structures like Ä9LOODJH´, ÄWRZQ´ and ÄFLW\´ are all words that define 
gatherings of human individuals and families into communities. They all form 
a kind of continuous interconnections, from the simplest rural settlement to the 
largest and most sophisticated urban complex of highly developed and 
intricately structured institutions. As such social capital which accompanies 
this structural evolution holds the entire edifice together by bonds of solidarity 
and common purpose. But the principle of solidarity acts as limit to the logic of 
neo-liberal economics and arbitrary capital accumulation. This has nothing to 
do with the positive aspects of market, which for centuries have acted within 
the limits of community ethics, and was considered part of the social capital- 
since it was not distorted as today. Traditions and community based way of life 
are facing a two-way battle. On the one side traditional communities are seen 
                                                 
64 Darrell BROWN, Jesse DILLARD and R. Scott MARSHALL (all three from the 
University of Portland - School of Business Administration): Triple Bottom Line: A business 
metaphor for a social construct, presented on the occasion of a conference at the Universitat 
$XWzQRPDGH%DUFHORQD0DUFK 
65 Anne EVENO: /HVDLGHVGHO
(WDWDX[HQWUHSULVHVUHSUpVHQWHQWHXURVSDUKDELWDQW La 
Tribune.fr-Paris, 2007-01-25. www.latribune.fr/info/Les-aides-de-l-Etat-aux-entreprises-
representent-949-euros-par-habitant-~-ID31A567A485AF879CC125726D004297FA-$Db= 
Tribune/Articles.nsf (Date of retrieval 2007-01-25). 
66 /¶([SDQVLRQFRP /H GpILFLW SXEOLF IUDQoDLV DWteindra 3,5%, Paris - 2007-01-25. 
www.lexpansion.com/art/15.211.62380.0.html (Date of retrieval) 2007-01-25.  
67 Darrell BROWN, Jesse DILLARD and R. Scott MARSHALL: op.cit.  
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as cell of economic underdevelopment, compared to the cob-web of economic 
interactions which is globalization. The other, on the political front, by the 
claiming that traditional communities refuse political integration by denying 
adapting to the institutional structures of modern government ± which are as 
arbitrary as the modern market. The ensuing destruction of social capital both 
institutional and cultural is creating a new form of economic slavery and 
political disintegration. Unfortunately the lessons of history do not hinder the 
quest for GDP growth.  
